We study the rationality of learning and the biases in expectations in the Iowa Experimental Markets. Using novel tests developed in (Bossaerts, P., 1996. Martingale restrictions on equilibrium security prices under rational expectations and consistent beliefs. Caltech working paper; Bossaerts, P., 1997. The dynamics of equity prices in fallible markets. Caltech working paper), learning in the Iowa winner-take-all markets is found to be in accordance with the rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law). Hence, participants correctly update their beliefs using the available information. There is evidence, however, that beliefs do not satisfy the restrictions of rational expectations that they re¯ect the factual distribution of outcomes. Ó
Introduction
Over the last several decades, empirical analysis in virtually all of ®nance as well as a large part of macroeconomics has been based on the assumption of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). There, rational expectations are primarily understood to imply that investors' beliefs are correct.
1 This means that agents are able to weigh potential future outcomes using probabilities that re¯ect the frequencies with which these factually will occur. In other words, their priors coincide with the true probability measure. Rational expectations do not necessarily imply that investors have perfect foresight. However, to the extent that future events are uncertain, investors correctly infer the necessary information from signals (including prices in the market), applying the rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law).
The correctness of beliefs in the ®nance/macrode®nition of rational expectations is not crucial for many theoretical insights, such as the Euler equation restrictions obtained in Lucas (1978) , the existence of an equivalent martingale measure shown in Harrison and Kreps (1979) , 2 or the dealer market pricing equations of Kyle (1985) . These continue to hold even if we allow for biases in investors' beliefs. But expectations must then be taken with respect to agents' subjective beliefs instead of the``true probability measure''.
Instead, the attraction of the rational expectations assumption is exclusively empirical. It facilitates estimation and testing of asset pricing models, because agents' beliefs can readily be obtained from the empirical distribution. Parsimonious model testing ensues, as exempli®ed by Hansen and Singleton (1982) . Rational expectations is further motivated by the fear that the possibility of biases in beliefs would require the empiricist to be much more speci®c about the economy, and, in particular, about learning, with the consequent danger that asset pricing models may be rejected because the evolution of beliefs was misspeci®ed.
Still, the assumption of rational expectations has been criticized as unrealistic. Proponents defend it as the adequate long-run description of an economy by pointing out that rational expectations can be acquired by learning. Of course, this does not provide sucient ground to ignore the initial biases in beliefs and potentially transient learning in tests of asset pricing models. For 1 There is a micro-theoretic literature on rational expectations, which does not necessarily imply correctness of beliefs. See Radner (1967) , Green (1973) . Here, we refer to the concept of a Dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibrium, as originally de®ned in Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1978 , where beliefs are explicitly assumed to be correct. This concept seems to have gotten its inspiration from the vaguer idea of an informationally ecient market in ®nance (Fama, 1970 (Fama, , 1991 . See also Muth (1961) . 2 We do rule out asymmetric information here, though. Asymmetric information would generally invalidate the existence of an equivalent martingale measure even under correct beliefs. instance, Bossaerts (1995) proves analytically how standard rational expectations test are aected even asymptotically by initial biases and transient learning. That article also illustrates the fragility of the asymptotic distributional properties of test statistics as one alters the speci®cation of beliefs and beliefs updating.
The necessity of specifying the learning environment when one deviates from REE was, however, recently challenged in Bossaerts (1996 Bossaerts ( , 1997 . That paper derives a set of martingale restrictions on securities prices that neither depend on the priors nor on the likelihood function. One of the securities considered in Bossaerts (1996 Bossaerts ( , 1997 was of the simple Arrow±Debreu type: it pays one dollar in one state of the world, and zero in all others. Markets were assumed to be populated with risk-neutral agents endowed with unknown priors. These agents, however, used Bayes' law to infer the actual state from sequences of signals. To re¯ect the close relationship with the game-theoretic literature (in particular, Harsanyi, 1967) , let us refer to the ensuing equilibrium as the Bayesian Equilibrium (BE).
The purpose of the present paper is to illustrate how the theoretical results in Bossaerts (1996 Bossaerts ( , 1997 can be implemented to test for BE against the more restrictive traditional REE. In the absence of an explicit speci®cation of priors and likelihood functions, we only test the central part of a Bayesian Equilibrium, namely investor's usage of Bayes' law to update beliefs. Since Bayesian updating is rational in the sense that it implies that the agent cannot forecast where her beliefs will go next, we eectively study the rationality of updating. This contrasts with tests of REE, where one requires not only rational updating, but also correct priors.
We investigate the pricing of``winner take all'' contracts traded in the computerized experimental markets developed at the University of Iowa. Winner-take-all contracts are simple examples of Arrow±Debreu securities: they pay $1 in one state of the world; $0 in all others. We study the contracts which derive their payo from price changes of stocks in the computer industry and the S&P500 index.
Our focusing on experimental markets should be attributed to the absence of real markets with Arrow±Debreu securities. Still, one could imply synthetic Arrow±Debreu securities prices from the prices of widely traded put and call option contracts. Our restrictions could be tested on these synthetic prices. See Bondarenko (1997) for an application to S&P500 index options. An alternative would be to directly study put and call prices: Bossaerts (1996 Bossaerts ( , 1997 derived restrictions on their prices as well. A disadvantage is that these restrictions are more involved and less intuitive.
We ®nd that prices in the Iowa markets re¯ect rational learning. Evidence against rational expectations surfaces, however, indicating that investors may have started with biased priors. Among other things, there is a pronounced negative correlation between the price level and the subsequent price change. This ®nding is not unlike the evidence from stock markets (e.g., Keim and Stambaugh, 1986) .
It deserves emphasis that the latter does not necessarily imply that there is money to be made in the future. Ex ante, and absent insider information, the priors of participants in the Iowa markets are as good as any other. To ®nd that they were biased in the past, i.e., ex post, will not necessarily help an outsider to pro®t in the future. The negative correlation between the price level and the subsequent price change does indicate that market priors were biased. But we lack the necessary data to estimate the nature of this bias with sucient precision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the theory with the help of a simple example. (The general proof is in the Appendix.) Section 3 describes the Iowa experimental markets that are the focus of the study. Section 4 presents the results of the tests of the rationality of learning. Section 5 investigates rational expectations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The theory by example
Consider a world in which a state variable, h, can take on two values: h or h. Securities are traded and markets clear at two discrete points in time, indexed t 1Y 2. Consider an Arrow±Debreu security which pays o at t 3, $1 if h h and zero otherwise. Risk-neutral investors do not know h before the end of the second period, i.e., before time t 3. At time t 2, however, they do receive a signal s, which they use to update their beliefs about the value of h. The equilibrium price at time t is denoted p t .
For the moment, we are going to assume that agents have rational expectations. In other words, they know the true probability measure P which determines the relative frequency with which signals and states are drawn. They will use this probability measure to infer from the signals whether h h or not.
The ®rst price, p 1 , will be set to equal the unconditional probability (prior) that h h. Mathematically More generally, the return sequence will form a martingale dierence sequence. This, of course, is an old result, which goes back to Samuelson (1965) .
Result 2. We now take the point of view of an econometrician contemplating a single price sequence. In this sequence, h remins fixed. We assume that the econometrician observes the price history after time t 3, so that she knows the value of h. In that case, the expectation in (6) 
In words, there is an upward drift in prices. Of course, this is not surprising, because the econometrician picked a sequence of prices for a security that she knows matured in the money. If she had picked a security that had matured out of the money, she would have observed a negative drift.
Result 3. Is there a simple way to correct for the upward drift in (7)? Consider the conditional expectation of the inverse of the price at time 2:
we conclude
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In words, modifying the return by taking as basis not the past price but the future prie makes it unpredictable! The martingale dierence result in (9) is very general. It does not depend on the likelihood function; it solely follows from investors' using Bayes' law to update their beliefs. Over time, signals can be dependent. See Bossaerts (1996 Bossaerts ( , 1997 for details and a general proof. Intuitively, the result obtains from taking the future price as basis to compute a return, which cancels the drift in (7). The latter equation eectively implies that the new basis for the return measure, the future price, is higher on average than the old basis, the past price.
We are now going to relax the assumption of rational expectations. Investors no longer are required to use the``true'' probability measure P. Instead, they use another measure, P Ã , which is related to P, as follows. Factor P into a measure l over the possible values of the state variable h and a conditional measure P h which determines the likelihood of signal outcomes conditional on h (the likelihood functions in the above example are derived from P h ). Likewise, factor P Ã into a prior k 0 over the state variable, and a conditional measure P h over the signal sequence. Notice that we constrain the signal likelihoods to be the same under both P and P Ã . The priors, however, may dier: Nature uses l to draw h; agents posit k 0 .
Consider the speci®c case where P Ã fh hg 1 2 . Nature continues to draw h according to the old law, which assigns only probability 1 4 to the event fh hg. Apparently, investors are too optimistic. From the speci®cation of beliefs, we conclude
Also, if s 1, then computations that are analogous to those for the rational expectations case reveal
Let us now reconsider the conditional expectations in Results 1±3. We continue to compute them under the probability measure P, which is the one that governs the data as observed by the econometrician. In other words, P is the measure that determines the behavior of statistics that the econometrician may want to compute. 
Consequently,
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Unlike Result 1, however, Eq. (13) is not roust. By changing the prior k 0 , we can easily overturn it. In our numerical example, investors are too optimistic about the likelihood of h; in other words, they overestimate the probability that the Arrow±Debreu security will mature in-the-money. Had we taken them to be more pessimistic, by assuming, for instance, that P Ã fh hg 1 8
, the inequality would have been reversed.
Result 5. Now augment the information with the knowledge that h h:
This result may not seem to be robust either, in the sense that it can be overturned by changing the prior k 0 . This is not true; we come back to this point shortly.
Result 6. Recompute the conditional expectation of the inverse price
Again modifying the return by taking the future price as basis
The martingale property of the modi®ed return has been unaected by our relaxing the assumption of rational expectations! Appendix A proves that the last result is robust. It does not depend on agents' priors. It is merely a consequence of investors' using Bayes' law to update their beliefs. This is remarkable in view of the many instances in which the conclusion from Bayesian analysis are sensitive to the speci®cation of the prior.
Since the modi®ed return of``winning securities'' is a martingale dierence sequence, the traditional return must have a positive expectation when conditioning on the outcome as well. This follows readily from Jensen's inequality (which is strict because the signal is nontrivial):
Hence, Result 5 is robust. It holds regardless of the prior. With respect to Arrow±Debreu securities, further developments can also be found in Bondarenko (1997) . For more general ecurities, the reader is referred to Bossaerts (1996 Bossaerts ( , 1997 .
The above results have many implications. In the present paper, we focus on the analysis of a cross-section of independent price sequences. In conjunction with such a dataset, the above results can be used to distinguish between the traditional REE and the more general BE. Under the latter, priors can be arbitrary. Under REE, Result 1 can be veri®ed in a cross-section of random histories of prices of Arrow±Debreu securities. If the property in (6) is rejected, rational expectations must be rejected as well.
3 That would not reject rationality, however. Agents could have started with biased beliefs. For rationality, they need only to apply correctly the rules of conditional probability. That is the core of the more general class of Bayesian Equilibria. In those, a martingale result holds only for the modi®ed return of securities that matured in the money. This is the content of Results 4±6. A cross-section of price histories of``winning'' Arrow±Debreu securities would allow us to test the proposition that investors' learning is rational. This will be the subject of the subsequent empirical investigation.
One wonders what type of irrationality would lead to violations of Results 4±6. It can be shown (see Bossaerts and Hillion, 1997 ) that over-reaction to news leads to negative average modi®ed returns on winning securities, and under-reaction (sluggishness) causes positive average modi®ed returns. Overreaction and under-reaction is to be de®ned relative to Bayes' law. Bossaerts and Hillion (1997) also report simulations that illustrate that test statistics based on modi®ed returns have excellent power properties. Of course, the tests will not have any power against updating rules that lead to price reactions that are similar to those generated by Bayes' law (many frequency-analytic estimation procedures have that property).
Finally, notice that the key implication of BE, Result 2, can be tested on biased samples. Only price series of``winning'' Arrow±Debreu securities are needed. If histories of losers are unavailable to the researcher, she can still test for BE. This is a real opportunity, because many historical ®nancial databases do come with such a``survivorship bias''. The one we are about to present here does not suer from survivorship bias. This allows us to demonstrate in detail the workings of our theory and tests.
The Iowa experimental market
The College of Business Administration at the University of Iowa runs a number of markets in winner-take-all contracts based on the returns or prices of US stock exchange listed securities and indices. Each month, a new set of contracts is oered. Contract liquidation values are determined by rates of return or changes in closing prices of the underlying stock measured from the third Friday of one month to the third Friday of the next month. Trade starts on Monday following the third Friday of the month. Trading halts when the liquidation value is determined. Rates of return on the underlying stock securities are adjusted for dividend payments. Rates of return on indices are not dividend-adjusted.
Iowa manages another set of markets, where the payos on the traded securities depend on political events, such as the outcome of presidential or parliamentary elections. These markets pre-date the ones that we are studying here. For an in-depth analysis of the political markets, see Forsythe et al. (1992) .
We investigate two sets of markets: the computer industry returns markets and the Microsoft price level markets. Four winner-take-all contracts are traded in the former. They pay one dollar depending on which underlying security had the highest return: Apple, IBM, Microsoft or the S&P500, respectively. Contracts written on losers expire worthless. Hence, these contracts are Arrow±Debreu securities written on a state space determined by the returns of the aforementioned stocks and the S&P500 index. In the Microsoft markets, two contracts are traded. One, the``High'' contract, pays a dollar when Microsoft's next month closing price is above a predetermined cut-o level. The other one, the``Low'', pays one dollar in the complementary state. The cut-o level is determined by the exercise price of the closest-at-the-money, exchangetraded option (CBOE) on Microsoft.
The trading mechanism of the Iowa Electronic Market is the computerized double auction. Participation extends beyond the University of Iowa (the market is internet-based), but is restricted to investors with academic aliations. In addition to trading individual contracts, a``market'' portfolio can be purchased and sold. This is a unit portfolio which bundles all contracts in a set of markets, and, hence, guarantees a unit payout. It can be purchased from or sold to the system for a unit price, or bought/sold in the market (the latter requires, however, that there be quotes in all contracts).
We limit our attention to daily closing prices, which are de®ned to be the last transaction price before midnight, or, if no transactions took place, the previous closing price. Notice that closing prices, and, hence, returns, on complementary contracts are nonsynchronous. This implies, among other things, that the closing prices do not necessarily add up to one, even if a bundle of complementary contracts guarantees a unit payo, and that returns are not colinear. Let us look at the data to gauge the importance of nonsynchrony. Table 1 displays some descriptive price and volume statistics. Fig. 1 plots the price paths for the two Microsoft securities over four sample months. Table 1 lists the average and standard deviation of the absolute deviation of the sum of the prices of complementary securities from one. The numbers are sizeable, indicating that nonsynchrony is a serious problem. It also means that the returns on complementary securities are not necessarily colinear, a fact that we will exploit in our tests. The lack of colinearity is also apparent from Fig. 1 : if synchronous, the price paths of the two Microsoft securities should be perfectly symmetric with respect to a line through $0.50. They are not. Table 1 also documents substantial positive skewness and extreme kurtosis in the distribution of returns. Readers familiar with derivatives markets (such as the winner-take-all markets we are studying here) will not be surprised. The kurtosis is also apparent in Fig. 1 . The history for the 10/95 Microsoft High contract (which pays $1 if Microsoft's price increased from September 1995) includes a day (10/17/95) when the price jumped from $0.024 to $0.455, a return of 1796%! The skewness is re¯ected in the surprisingly high average daily return. See Table 1 . The averages are less than two standard errors from zero, however, except in the pooled sample.
Testing rationality of learning
Results 3 and 6 of Section 2 demonstrate that one can use the modi®ed return (where the end-of-period price is used to de¯ate payos) of winning securities to test for the rationality of learning. Those results solely depended on agents' correctly applying the rules of conditional probability (Bayes' law), and not on the initial beliefs, which could be arbitrarily biased. Let us look at the returns and modi®ed returns on winning securities in the Iowa market data described in the previous section. Because of Results 2 and 5 in Section 2, we expect the traditional return to be positive on average. This contrasts with the modi®ed return, which should be zero on average. We computed average daily returns and modi®ed returns for each monthlong price history and then tested whether the average (of this average) was zero across the monthly histories. Since the dataset covers sixteen months, we will have a cross-section of sixteen averages for each individual set of markets (the Microsoft markets and the computer industry markets separately) and thirty-two averages when we pool both sets of markets. The outcomes in the cross-section can safely be assumed to be independent.
We can also look at the securities with payos complementary to those of the losing securities. Of course, the complementary securities are winners as well. Complementary securities can easily be created by purchasing the market portfolio from the system for $1 and selling one traded security. We take the price of the complementary security to be the value of this portfolio. In the Microsoft case, each security is the complement of the other, so that results are expected to be similar to those obtained from actually traded winning securities. Discrepancies will arise, however, because securities trade nonsynchronously. In the computer industry markets, the complementary security to, say, Apple, is the one that pays $1 if any other security than Apple wins.
In the computer industry markets, there will be correlation across monthly histories of complementary securities that traded simultaneously, i.e., during the same month. The results that we are about to report do not correct for this. When we attempted to address the problem (mainly by running Seemingly Unrelated Regressions), the results were not altered qualitatively. Table 2 displays the average of the time series daily return average, as well as its standard error. In all cases is this average more than two standard errors above zero, corroborating Results 2 and 5. Table 2 also lists results for the average of the time series daily modi®ed return average. It is always within two standard errors from zero, in accordance with Results 3 and 6. 4 In Table 1 , we documented extreme skewness and kurtosis in the distribution of returns. One wonders to what extent these aect the inference in Table 2 . Therefore, Table 2 also displays the skewness and excess kurtosis of the month-long averages. The values are far more acceptable, rendering credibility to our results. This is certainly so for the modi®ed returns.
We can conclude provisionally that learning in the Iowa markets is rational: there are no biases in the modi®ed returns of winning securities.
In fact, Results 3 and 6 are stronger than this simple test of the average modi®ed return may indicate. For learning to be rational, the average modi®ed return of winning securities ought to be unpredictable from any past information. We can test this in two ways.
First, we can correlate the modi®ed return with past information, by computing the average of the modi®ed return times, say, the lagged price, or the lagged price squared. Second, we can simply regress the modi®ed return onto lagged information, e.g., the lagged price.
Let us discuss results from the ®rst strategy. We compute monthly averages of daily observations of x t1 p t and a N denotes sample size (number of monthly histories). r denotes the average across all month-long histories of the time series average daily traditional return. x denotes the average across all monthlong histories of the time series average daily modi®ed return, where the payo is divided by the end-of-period closing price. Standard error in parentheses. Ã and ÃÃ indicate that the statistic is more than 1.8 and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively. The closing prices of complements to losers is obtained by subtracting the closing price of a loser from the price at which the market portfolio can be bought from the system (i.e., $1). The price history of the complements to the losers is not identical to that of the winners, because of nonsynchrony.
and test whether they are zero across the months. Of course, we continue to limit our attention to winners. For comparison, we also report results for monthly averages based on the traditional return, i.e., from r t1 p t and r t1 p t 2 X Table 3 reports the results. In no case is the monthly average of x t1 p t or x t1 p t 2 signi®cantly dierent from zero, supporting Bayesian Equilibrium. This contrasts with the averages of r t1 p t and r t1 p t 2 , which are all signi®-cantly positive. Taking the results of Tables 2 and 3 together, the modi®ed return of winning contracts is not predictable from past information embedded in the price level.
The second strategy, whereby we project the (modi®ed) daily return onto the previous day's closing price using OLS, deserves more discussion. Many researchers, starting with Keim and Stambaugh (1986) , have found that stock returns are negatively related to the lagged price levels. For winners, however, the projection of the modi®ed return onto lagged prices should produce insigni®cant results, at least if prices are set in a Bayesian Equilibrium. We verify this for the Iowa markets.
When plainly projecting the modi®ed return on the lagged price, however, the error exhibits substantial heteroscedasticity: its variance is far higher for low price levels. This obviously aects the inference. It turns out that there is a simple way to correct for the heteroscedasticity in the error term, namely, by regressing the modi®ed return times the lagged price (x t1 p t ) onto the lagged price (p t ). Table 4 reports results of this alternative projection. For comparison purposes, we also display results for OLS projections of the traditional daily return multiplied by the lagged price (i.e., the price change) onto the lagged price. The contrast between the highly signi®cant coecients for the traditional return against the small and insigni®cant ones for the modi®ed return is striking. As before, Bayesian Equilibrium (or rational learning) is supported. Table 4 are far higher than those reported in Tables 2 and 3 . However, the latter display averages of mean daily returns across months, whereas the former displays statistics based on all daily observations, pooled from the monthly time series. This dierence is without consequence. For instance, when we computed averages in Tables 2 and 3 by pooling the monthly histories of daily data, as in Table 4 , the results did not change signi®cantly (obviously, the sample means did not change at all).
For space considerations, we do not report results for the securities that are complementary to the losers. They do not lead to dierent inference. The interested reader can obtain the results for these securities from the authors.
Testing for rational expectations
As is well-known, REE can readily be tested by verifying (in-sample) predictability of returns using past information. We must not, however, condition on future information, such as, e.g., the eventual payo on a security. In the previous section, we did so, because the tests were inspired by Results 3 and 6. a N denotes sample size (number of monthly histories). rp denotes the average across all month-long histories of the time series average daily traditional return multiplied by the lagged price level. xp denotes the average across all month-long histories of the time series average daily modi®ed return multiplied by the lagged price level. rp 2 denotes the average across all month-long histories of the time series average daily traditional return multiplied by the square of the lagged price level. xp 2 denotes the average across all month-long histories of the time series average daily modi®ed return multiplied by the square of the lagged price level. Standard error in parentheses. Ã and ÃÃ indicate that the statistic is more than 1.8 and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively.
In contrast, tests of rational expectations are based on Result 1, where one conditions out (i.e., averages across) eventual outcomes.
We initially tested REE by projecting returns onto lagged prices. As with the projections leading to Table 4 , however, we discovered pronounced heteroscedasticity in the error term: its variance decreased with the price level. Again, a simple transformation purged the error of heteroscedasticity, namely, multiplication of the return by the lagged price. Of course, this means that the regressand became simply the change in the price over the subsequent day. Table 5 reports the results of the OLS projections of price changes onto lagged prices. A positive intercept and a negative slope coecient appear, both highly signi®cant. It is interesting to note that this is precisely what has been observed for US stock returns as well (see, e.g., Keim and Stambaugh, 1986) . Of course, this link is only suggestive: it is quite a leap of faith to claim that a To compute the modi®ed return, the payo is divided by the end-of-period price instead of the beginning-of-period price. N denotes sample size (number of daily returns). Ã and ÃÃ indicate that the statistic is more than 1.8 and 2 standard errors from zero, respectively. The standard return times the lagged price is identical to the price change (which is analyzed further in Table 5 ). Returns are multiplied by the lagged price in order to mitigate heteroscedasticity.
®ndings for the Iowa experimental markets have any implications for ocial US stock exchanges.
The evidence in Table 5 leads us to refute REE at high con®dence levels. Because we concluded in the previous section that closing prices in the Iowa markets re¯ect rational learning, however, we cannot attribute this rejection to over-reaction (the explanation usually advanced for this phenomenon in the stock markets). It must be agents' beliefs. They are biased, in violation of one of the assumptions behind rational expectations.
In what sense are beliefs biased? A closer investigation of the data revealed the following. Take the Microsoft markets, for instance. The Microsoft High contract matured in the money twelve times out of sixteen (months). This seems to indicate that chances for Microsoft High to pay o $1 are 75%, which would lead us to assign a value of $0.75 at the beginning of trading. We noticed, however, that the ®rst closing price for Microsoft High was often substantially dierent from $0.75. The deviation for the 9/95 contract, for instance, was more than $0.30 (see Fig. 1 ).
By themselves, these deviations from what we consider to be a fair value for the Microsoft High contract may merely be evidence of the superior information that markets possess over us, or they may re¯ect that the Microsoft High contract does not always start trading at the money. However, together with the negative relationship between price levels and subsequent returns, the deviations in the initial Microsoft High prices from fair value seem to indicate that Iowans started out with more extreme priors than can be justi®ed ex post. Beliefs subsequently reverted back to some more acceptable level.
One would of course want more precise estimates of the nature of the belief biases over the particular period under study. Unfortunately, we observe only sixteen (one-month) histories of the evolution of the beliefs. This means that we implicitly only have sixteen sample points with which to compare the ®nal outcome with the initial price (belief). Such a sample size is simply too small to make any con®dent statements about the direction of the bias in the market's priors.
In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that a comparison between the negative correlation between price levels and subsequent price changes (documented in Table 5 ), on the one hand, and the absence of correlation between the modi®ed return and lagged prices for winning securities (documented in Table 4 ), on the other hand, did allow us to conclude that initial beliefs must have been biased. It underscores the power of our methodology. However, we cannot go further and estimate precisely what the bias in initial beliefs was like.
As a ®nal note, we should caution the reader against overinterpreting our evidence against rational expectations. Return measures do not always accurately re¯ect potential pro®tability. Our returns are computed on the basis of transaction prices. Transactions could take place either at the bid or at the ask. If today's closing transactions took place at the bid, and tomorrow's at the ask, the return one computes from the closing prices measures incorrectly the payo on a strategy of purchasing the security at today's close and selling at tomorrow's close. 6 Among other things, the regression results reported in Table 5 could be aected by this bid±ask bounce, if closes with a low price predominantly take place at the bid. The subsequent return would be biased upward. This bias would translate into a negative correlation between the error in the regression of returns onto previous closing prices and the regressor. The OLS slope coecient would be negatively biased. Absent quote data, however, we have no way to tell how severe this problem is.
Still, it is important to appreciate that if bid±ask bounce biased the regressions with the traditional return as regressor, it ought to have aected the ones with the modi®ed return as regressand as well. Tables 3 and 4 documented, however, that the results for the latter conform nicely to the theory. This makes our evidence against rational expectations less ambivalent.
Conclusion
We cannot ®nd any predictability in return sequences of winning securities in the Iowa experimental markets where the payos are de®ned with respect to US exchange-listed stock. The returns were suitably modi®ed to adjust for the selection bias caused by our focusing on securities that matured in the money. Since these modi®ed returns are unpredictable if agents correctly apply the rules of conditional probability, we conclude that we cannot reject that market prices in Iowa re¯ect rational learning.
In contrast, we ®nd evidence of in-sample predictability of returns, in the form of a negative correlation between the daily price change and the level of the previous closing price. Since in-sample predictability violates rational expectations but agents appear to have correctly implemented Bayes' law, we conclude that their priors must have been biased. We do not have enough data, however, to estimate the precise nature of the biases in initial beliefs that participants in the Iowa markets appear to have had over the period under investigation.
What does this mean in terms of the traditional notion of market eciency (Fama, 1970 (Fama, , 1991 , i.e., for a newcomer's ability to``make money''? Based on the evidence reported here, a newcomer should refrain from betting against the Iowa markets. There is no money to be made from mistakes against the rules of conditional probability. We did ®nd that priors in the Iowa markets were biased. But these biases may have been period-speci®c. In other words, there is no guarantee that they would still be there in the future. Moreover, we did not have enough data to estimate their nature within acceptable limits. The bottom line is: the marginal bet in the Iowa market is pure speculation.
